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12-19-2025 & 1-14-2026 Attorney Letter & Develop. Order App.
DILL, EVANS R.HODEBACK —ATTORNEYS AT LAW — Warren W. Dill, Esq. also admitted in WY D. Johnathan Rhodeback, Esq. also admitted in NY Raul A. Perez, Esq. LLM Master of Law- Taxation Mark W. Packard, Esq. also admitted in NJ Kenya L. Matthews, Esq. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS • COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS • BUSINESSES REAL ESTATE • CIVIL LITIGATION • ELDER LAW December 19, 2025 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL: ABemard@citvofsebastian.ors Alix Bernard, Community Development Director City of Sebastian, FL 1225 Main Street Sebastian, FL 32958 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO CITY COUNCIL Re: Ameron Boat & RV Storage — 45 Ashbury Boulevard Schulke, Bittle & Stoddard Project #18-143 Dear Ms. Bernard: Please accept this letter as my clients' formal request to appeal the Planning and Zoning Commission's denial of my clients' (1) conditional use application, (2) site plan application, and (3) waiver request for the above -referenced project. Pursuant to Section 54-1-2.4(g) of the City's Land Development Code, enclosed please find the agenda packet containing the documents, plans, and papers reviewed and considered by the Planning and Zoning Commission. The testimony and arguments made at the meeting can be viewed at httDs://www.voutube.com/watch?v=zavmlHR409w. If the City prefers a different format for these submittals, please let me know. Respectfully, the Planning and Zoning Commission's denial was not supported by competent, substantial evidence rendering it improper under Florida law. See Section 286.0115(c), Florida Statutes; Orange County v. Butler, 877 So.2d 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Quasi-judicial decisions, unlike legislative decisions, apply existing criteria — such as the conditional use factors set forth in the Land Development Code — to a specific set of facts. The Commissioner who made the motion for denial stated that he wanted to deny the project, but was unable to articulate a reason to do so. He therefore sought 1565 US Highway 1 Sebastian, FL 32958 Phone (772) 589-1212 - Fax (772) 589-5212 Attorneys(@ DillEvans.com Letter to Alix Bernard December 19, 2025 Page 2 of 2 assistance from another Commissioner, the Interim City Attorney, and the Planning Manager to formulate a basis for denial. Ultimately, the Planning and Zoning Commission denied the project because it was not "so designed, located, and proposed to be operated so that the public health, safety and welfare will be protected." From the comments made during deliberations prior to the vote, it appears that that Planning and Zoning Commission reached this conclusion due to layperson opinions regarding increased traffic and a greater risk of vehicular accidents. Candidly, this conclusion is not supported by any analysis performed by a qualified individual and is instead at odds with the expert analysis performed by the project engineer. All competent, substantial evidence submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission conclusively established that the project would have a de minimis impact on traffic and has been safely designed for vehicular traffic by a qualified engineer. A layperson's belief to the contrary is wholly insufficient to support the conclusion that traffic will increase and the roads will be unsafe. Accordingly, on behalf of my clients, I respectfully request that the City Council reverse the decisions made by the Planning and Zoning Commission and ultimately approve my clients' conditional use application, site plan application, and waiver request. Pursuant to Section 54-1-2.4(g)(2) of the City's Land Development Code, please have the City Manager place this matter on the City Council's agenda for consideration. If you require anything further, please do not hesitate to ask. Sincerely, D.Johnathan Rhodeb DJR/ig Enclosures: Agenda Packet for Meeting of Planning & Zoning Commission on December 18, 2025 Cc: Dom Bosworth, Planning Manager, dbowworth@citvofsebastian.ore Brian Benton, City Manager, bbenton@citvofsebastian.ore James Stokes, Interim City Attorney, istokes@cityofsebastian.ore 286.0116. Access to local public officials; quasi-judicial..., Fl- ST § 286.0115 West's Florida Statutes Annotated Title XIX. Public Business (Chapters 279-290) Chapter 286. Public Business: Miscellaneous Provisions (Refs & Annos) West's F.S.A. § 286.0115 286.oil5. Access to local public officials; quasi-judicial proceedings on local government land use matters Currentness (1)(a) A county or municipality may adopt an ordinance or resolution removing the presumption of prejudice from ex parte communications with local public officials by establishing a process to disclose ex pane communications with such officials pursuant to this subsection or by adopting an alternative process for such disclosure. However, this subsection does not require a county or municipality to adopt any ordinance or resolution establishing a disclosure process. (b) As used in this subsection, the term "local public official" means any elected or appointed public official holding a county or municipal office who recommends or takes quasi-judicial action as a member of a board or commission. The term does not include a member of the board or commission of any state agency or authority. (c) Any person not otherwise prohibited by statute, charter provision, or ordinance may discuss with any local public official the merits of any matter on which action may be taken by any board or commission on which the local public official is a member. If adopted by county or municipal ordinance or resolution, adherence to the following procedures shall remove the presumption of prejudice arising from ex parte communications with local public officials. 1. The substance of any ex parte communication with a local public official which relates to quasi-judicial action pending before the official is not presumed prejudicial to the action if the subject of the communication and the identity of the person, group, or entity with whom the communication took place is disclosed and made a part of the record before final action on the matter. 2. A local public official may read a written communication from any person. However, a written communication that relates to quasi-judicial action pending before a local public official shall not be presumed prejudicial to the action, and such written communication shall be made a part of the record before final action on the matter. 3. Local public officials may conduct investigations and site visits and may receive expert opinions regarding quasi-judicial action pending before them. Such activities shall not be presumed prejudicial to the action if the existence of the investigation, site visit, or expert opinion is made a part of the record before final action on the matter. 4. Disclosure made pursuant to subparagraphs 1., 2., and 3. must be made before or during the public meeting at which a vote is taken on such matters, so that persons who have opinions contrary to those expressed in the ex parte communication are given a reasonable opportunity to refute or respond to the communication. This subsection does not subject local public officials to part III of chapter 112 for not complying with this paragraph. WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 286.0115. Access to local public officials; quasi-judicial..., FL ST § 286.0115 (2)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), a county or municipality may adopt an ordinance or resolution establishing the procedures and provisions of this subsection for quasi-judicial proceedings on local government land use matters. The ordinance or resolution shall provide procedures and provisions identical to this subsection. However, this subsection does not require a county or municipality to adopt such an ordinance or resolution. (b) In a quasi-judicial proceeding on local government land use matters, a person who appears before the decisionmaking body who is not a party or party -intervenor shall be allowed to testify before the decisionmaking body, subject to control by the decisionmaking body, and may be requested to respond to questions from the decisionmaking body, but need not be sworn as a witness, is not required to be subject to cross-examination, and is not required to be qualified as an expert witness. The decisionmaking body shall assign weight and credibility to such testimony as it deems appropriate. A party or party - intervenor in a quasi-judicial proceeding on local government land use matters, upon request by another party or party - intervenor, shall be swom as a witness, shall be subject to cross-examination by other parties or party -intervenors, and shall be required to be qualified as an expert witness, as appropriate. (c) In a quasi-judicial proceeding on local government land use matters, a person may not be precluded from communicating directly with a member of the decisionmaking body by application of ex parte communication prohibitions. Disclosure of such communications by a member of the decisionmaking body is not required, and such nondisclosure shall not be presumed prejudicial to the decision of the decisionmaking body. All decisions of the decisionmaking body in a quasi- judicial proceeding on local government land use matters must be supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record pertinent to the proceeding, irrespective of such communications. (3) This section does not restrict the authority of any board or commission to establish rules or procedures governing public hearings or contacts with local public officials. Credits Added by Laws 1995, c. 95-352, § 1, eff. June 17, 1995. Amended by Laws 1996, c. 96-324, § 31, eff. Oct. 1, 1996. West's F. S. A. § 286.0115, FL ST § 286.0115 Current with laws, joint and concurrent resolutions and memorials in effect from the 2025 Special Session C and through July 1, 2025, of the 2025 first regular session. End of Document &) 2026 Thomson Reuters No claim to original U S. Government Works. WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Orange County v. Butler, 877 So.2d 810 (2004) 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1561 877 So.2d 81Lo District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, Petitioner, V. Shirley J. BUTLER, Respondent. No. 5Do4-773 1 July 2, 2ao4. Synopsis Background: Landowner petitioned for writ of certiorari from decision of the County Board of Commissioners which found that her property was in violation of county zoning code and ordered her to correct the violation. The Circuit Court, Orange County, acting in its appellate capacity, granted landowner's petition for writ of certiorari and quashed Board's decision. County sought certiorari review. ]Holding:] The District Court of Appeal, Orfinger, J., held that Circuit Court exceeded scope of its review authority when it quashed Board's decision. Certiorari granted; order quashed. West Headnotes (3) Ir1 Zoning and Planningw-Decisions of boards or officers in general Zoning and Planning# -Substantial evidence in general Zoning and Planning: Scope and Extent of Review The decision by County Board of Commissioners to uphold county board of zoning adjustment's decision that landowner's property was in violation of county zoning code was a quasi- judicial decision, and as a result, the standard of review at the Circuit Court level was limited to whether the Board had provided landowner procedural due process, observed the essential requirements of law, and based its decision on competent substantial evidence, and at the next level, District Court of Appeal's inquiry was limited to whether the Circuit Court provided procedural due process and whether it applied the correct law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 1 Case that cites this headnote 121 Zoning and Planningv-Weight and sufficiency, equitable relief Circuit Court exceeded scope of its review authority when it quashed County Board of Commissioners' decision that landowner's property violated county zoning code; record was replete with evidence supporting Board's conclusion that landowner was using her property as junkyard, and Circuit Court focused only on whether there was any substantial evidence supporting county's determination that landowner's use of property to repair race cars as hobby was not a legal, non -conforming use, but in doing so, Circuit Court failed to consider abundant evidence of primary use of property as junkyard, a prohibited activity, irrespective of her ability to use land for racing hobby. 1 Case that cites this headnote 131 Municipal, County, and Local Government#+ Judicial Review or Intervention A local government's quasi-judicial decision must be upheld if there is any competent, substantial evidence supporting it. 3 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *811 Thomas B. Drage, Jr., County Attorney, and Vivien J. Monaco, Assistant County Attorney, Orange County Attorney's Office, Orlando, for Petitioner. Charlie S. Martin of McLeod, McLeod & McLeod, P.A., Apopka, for Respondent. Opinion ORFINGER, J. W ESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Orange County v. Butler, 877 So.2d 810 (2004) 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1561 Orange County, Florida, seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order granting Shirley J. Butler's petition for writ of certiorari. The circuit court's order quashed a decision of the Orange County Board of Commissioners (Board), which found that Butler's property was in violation of the Orange County Zoning Code, and ordered her to correct the violation. We grant the petition and issue the writ. This dispute began when the Orange County Code Enforcement Board (CEB) found Butler in violation of sections 38-3 and 38-77 of the Orange County Code (Code), concluding that "creating a junkyard, extensive auto repairs and open/outside storage of junk, auto parts, trash, debris, and tires is not permitted in residentially zoned areas," and requiring her to undertake remediation. In an effort to comply with the CEB order, Butler filed an application for a non -conforming land use, claiming that her property had been utilized "as a hobby shop since 1953 for the purpose of repairing race car vehicles owned by [Butler's] husband and five sons." Orange County's zoning manager denied Butler's request for a non -conforming *812 use, determining that there was insufficient evidence that the property had been continuously used for racing activities and that the dominant use of the property was for the storage of junk. Butler appealed the zoning manager's determination to the Orange County Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA). After a public hearing, the BZA upheld the zoning manager's determination that Butler's property was in violation of Code section 38-77 because the "outdoor/open storage of junk, tires, automobile parts, debris, and other similar waste materials is not a legal non -conforming use for the property." Butler then appealed the BZA decision to the Board, which upheld the BZA's determination that Butler's open storage of junk was not a legal non -conforming use for the property. Butler then filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court. Upon consideration, the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, granted Butler's petition and quashed the decision of the Board. In doing so, the circuit court focused on Butler's claim that her family's use of the property for their hobby of car racing and repair, constituted a legal non- conforming land use because it had been continuously used in that fashion since before the Orange County Code became effective. The circuit court concluded the record contained no substantial, competent evidence to support Orange County's determination that Butler's use of the property to repair race cars as a hobby was not a legal non -conforming use. However, the circuit court failed to address Orange County's determination that Butler's outdoor storage of junk, tires, automobile parts and other debris is not a legal non- conforming use of the property. In its petition, Orange County argues that the Board considered competent, substantial evidence supporting its conclusion that Butler's property was being primarily used for the outside storage of junk, tires, automobile parts, debris and other similar waste materials, all pointing to the dominant use of the property as a junkyard. Orange County complains that by focusing only on whether Butler had used the property continuously since 1953 for race car repairs, the circuit court ignored the substantial evidence supporting the determination that Butler was using her property as a junkyard. Orange County contends if Butler was using her property as a junkyard, it was irrelevant that she might be entitled to a legal non -conforming use for her family's hobby involving racing. We agree. 19 I21 We grant Orange County's petition for certiorari because the circuit court exceeded the scope of its review authority. The decision by the Board to uphold the BZA's decision is a quasi-judicial decision. As a result, the standard of review at the circuit court level was limited to whether the Board had provided Butler procedural due process, observed the essential requirements of law and based its decision on competent substantial evidence. Haines City Catty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995). At the district court level, our inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court provided procedural due process and whether it applied the correct law. Id. In the instant case, the record is replete with evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that Butler was using her property as ajunkyard for the "outdoor/open storage of junk, tires, automobile parts, debris and other similar waste materials." The circuit court focused only on whether there was any substantial competent evidence supporting Orange County's determination that Butler's use of the property to repair race cars as a hobby was not a legal, non -conforming use. But in doing so, the circuit *813 court failed to consider the abundant evidence of Butler's primary use of her property as a junkyard, a prohibited activity, irrespective of her ability to use her land for her family's racing hobby. 1�1 As a result, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law. A local government's quasi-judicial decision must be upheld if there is any competent, substantial evidence supporting it. Dorian v. Davis, 874 WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Orange County v. Butler, 877 So.2d 810 (2004) 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1561 So.2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Eckler v. Orange County, 763 So.2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a quasi- judicial determination by a local government should be upheld if any valid reason is supported by the record). As a result, we grant Orange County's petition for writ of certiorari and quash the circuit court's order. CERTIORARI GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED. GRIFFIN and MONACO, JJ, concur. All Citations 877 So.2d 810, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1561 WESTLAW 0 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Flowers Baking Co. v. City of Melbourne, 537 So.2d 1040 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 141 537 So.2d 1040 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. FLOWERS BAKING CO., etc., Petitioner, V. CITY OF MELBOURNE, Respondent. No. 88-1391. 1 Jan.5,1989. Rehearing Denied Feb. 3,1989• Synopsis Applicant petitioned for writ of certiorari, challenging city council's denial of conditional use permit for gasoline pumps and gasoline sales ancillary to proposed convenience store. The District Court of Appeal, Cowart, J., held that objections of local residents to conditional use permit based on fears as to increased traffic did not constitute substantial, competent evidence required to deny application for permit. Writ granted. Sharp, C.J., concurred in result only. West Headnotes (1) )1) Zoning and Planningir Auto service/retail store combinations Objections of local residents to conditional use permit based on fears as to increased traffic did not constitute substantial, competent evidence required to deny application for conditional use permit for gasoline pumps and gasoline sales ancillary to proposed convenience store. 3 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *1041 Patricia K. Olney of Spielvogel and Goldman, P.A., Merritt Island, for petitioner. Andrew A. Graham and Maureen M. Matheson of Reinman, Harrell, Silberhorn & Graham, Melbourne, for respondent. Opinion COWART, Judge. Petitioner applied for a conditional use permit for gasoline pumps and gasoline sales ancillary to a proposed convenience store in the City of Melbourne. Although the applicant agreed to meet the city zoning code's conditional use requirements for service stations, and also agreed to all of the Planning and Zoning Board's stipulations, local residents objected and the city council denied the permit. The applicant's petition to the circuit court for a writ of certiorari was denied: Once the applicant met the initial burden of showing that his application met the criteria of the city zoning code for granting such a permit, the burden was on the zoning authority to demonstrate, by substantial, competent evidence presented at a public hearing and made part of the record, that petitioner's application did not meet the zoning code requirements and that the requested permit was, in fact, adverse to the public interest. See Irvine v. Duval County Planning Commission, 495 So.2d 167 (Fla.1986), affirming the dissent of Judge Zehmer in Irvine v. Duval County Planning Commission, 466 So.2d 357 at 362 (Fla. Ist DCA 1985). Objections of local residents to the conditional use permit based on fears as to increased traffic do not constitute such substantial, competent evidence. See BML Investments v. City of Casselberry, 476 So.2d 713 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. denied 486 So.2d 595 (Fla.1986). WRIT GRANTED. REMANDED to the circuit court with instructions to direct the issuance of the conditional use permit. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. SHARP, C.J., concurs in result only. WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Flowers Baking Co. v. City of Melbourne, 537 So.2d 1040 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 141 All Citations 537 So.2d 1040, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 141 WESTLAW © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Permit Application No. i is HWEQF4RWM OtANDSupplemental Information Application for Appeal X t . This application is an appeal for (check one): X PZC decision Staff decision X 2. Specify basis of appeal. (Attach extra sheets if necessary): Attached please find letter of appeal to Ms. Alix Bernard, Community Development Director dated December 19, 2025. X 3. Attach the following: X a. Plans, papers, or materials constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken X b. Additional data and information as required to properly advise the City Council of the facts and circumstances needed to decide the case on Its merits. c. The names and addresses of all property owners whose property or part of their real property is within 300 feet of any outer boundary of the lot or parcel of land that is subject of the application. Permit Application No. City of Sebastian HOME.PLIICAN.. Development Order Application Applicant (if not owner, written authorization (notarized) from owner Is required) Name: William Brognano and Todd Brognano Address: PO Box 780874, Sebastian, FL 32978 Phone Number. (772 ) 589 - 1299 E-Mail: ameronh@aol.com Owner (If different from applicant) Name: FAX Number. ( ) - Address: Phone Number: ( ) - FAX Number: E-Mail: lltle of permit or action requested: Appeal of P&Ts denlal of oondftlonal use application, site plan applicatlon, and waterer request PLEASE COMPLETE ONLY THOSE SECTIONS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PERMIT OR ACTION THAT YOU ARE REQUESTING. COPIES OF ALL MAPS, SURVEYS, DRAWINGS, ETC. SHALL BE ATTACHED AND 8-1/2' BY 11' COPIES OF ANY ATTACHMENTS SHALL BE INCLUDED. ATTACH THE APPROPRIATE SUPPLEMETAL INFORMATION FORM. A. Project Name Of applicable): Ameron Boat & RV Storage Facility B. Site Information _ Address: 45 Ashbury Blvd., Sebastian, FL 32958 Lot: Block: Unit: Subdivision: Indian River County Parcel #: 31-39-07-00000-3000-00009.3 Zoning Classification: CG/Triangle Overlay Future Land Use: CG/Mixed Use Existing Use: Vacant Commercial Proposed Use: Detailed description of proposed activity and purpose extra sheets If necessary): Boat and RV storage facility We plan to construct and develop a boat and RV storage facility on the 3.76-acre parcel at 45 Ashbury Blvd, J DATE RECEIVED: I /A/,& FEE PAID: $?OO.,:;V RECEIVED BY:--TS p t `645 5 - Permit Application No. Phone Number: ( ) - FAX Number. ( ) - E-Mail: D. Johnathan Rhodeback of Dill, Evans & Rhodeback Address 1565 US Highway 1, Sebastian, FL 32958 Phone Number. (772 ) 589 -1212 E-Mail: attomeys@dillevans.com FAX Number. ( ) - Engineer: Name: Joseph Schulke of Schulke, Battle & Stoddard, LLC Address 1717 Indian River Blvd, Vero Beach, FL 32960 Phone Number. ( 772 ) 770 - 9622 FAX Number: E-Mail: info@sbsengineers.com Surveyor: Name: Brian C. Meman, PSM of CivilSury Design Group, Inc. Address 444 4th Lane SW, Vero Beach, FL 32962 Phone Number( 772 ) 323 - 2244 FAX Number. I. ,N i I ki & n9 1 - Air no n G nn , BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSE AND SAY THAr.AL I AM THE OWNER _ I AM THE LEGAL REPRESENTATrk OF THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED WHICH IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS APPLICATION, AND THAT ALL THE INFORMATION, MAPS, DATA AND/OR SKETCHES PROVIDED IN THIS APPLICATION ARE ACCU E AND TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. SIGtZW -- - -- DAJ - - - SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME BY V JI t �f2Y1L ! - 111%1Xr A *A,-) WHO IS PERSONALLY KNOWN TOME OR PRODUCED _ AS IDENTIFICATION, THIS 19, DAYOFq A It_) __, 20 NOTARY'S SIGNATURE _i PRINTED NAME OF NOTARY COMMISSION NO.IEXPIRATION SEAL: Nctary Public State of Florida Kristine L. Grunzweig My COmmisslon HH 8f8830 EXPIree 111812020 Permit Application No. The following is required for all comprehensive plan amendments, zoning amendments (Including rezoning), site plans, conditional use permits, special use permits, variances, exceptions, and appeals. I/WE, THE OWNER(S) / _ THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OWNER(S) OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPLICATION, HEREBY AUTHORIZE EACH AND EVERY MEMBER OF THE C 1 jj Couu i_I L - BOARD/COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF SEBASTIAN TO PHYSICALLY ENTER UPON THE PROPERTY AND VIEW THE PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH MY/OUR PENDING APPLICATION. I/WE HEREBY WAIVE ANY OBJECTION OR DEFENSE 1/WE MAY HAVE, DUE TO THE QUASI-JUDICIAL NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, RESULTING FROM ANY BOARD/COMMISSION MEMBER ENTERING OR VIEWING THE PROPERTY, INCLUDING ANY CLAIM OR ASSERTION THAT MY/OUR PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION OR THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED BY SUCH ENTERING OR VIEWING. THIS WAIVER AND CONSENT IS BEING SIGNED BY MFJUS VOLUNTARILY AND NOT AS A RESULT OF ANY COERCION APPLIED, OR PROMISES M E, BY NY EMPLOYEE, AGENT, CONTRACTOR OR OFFICIAL OF THE CITY OF SEBASTIAN. I1173 SIGNATURE DAZE Sworn to and subscribed before me by 1A ) LI 1 a w T,15MA R 0ute-0 who is ersonall known to me or produced as idenffication, this day of 4 ril 20a�. v Notarys Signature Printed Name of Notary Commission NoJExpiration Seal: FNMoaryPebllo Stateo!FIwIOaKtiatina L. Grunxwd8r CC" 'jorl HH 618668 Etpires 1N812029