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HomeMy WebLinkAbout07112013PZ MinutesCITY OF SEBASTIAN PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION 0 MINUTES OF REGULAR MEETING JULY 11, 2013 �.0 U c�oa Chairman Dodd called the meeting to order at 7:00 P.M. ' The pledge of allegiance was said by all. 0- G ROLL CALL: PRESENT: Mr. Dodd Mr. Qizilbash C O Ca Ms. Kautenburg (a) Mr. Durr (� Mr. Carter Mr. Reyes 9 0 -p -p 0 C ® N 3 EXCUSED: Mr. Paul and Mr. Roth "= O O ABSENT: Mr. Dyer 0 CL a tM CD N �' a 0n ALSO PRESENT: Jan King, Senior Planner Robert Ginsburg, City Attorney Dorri Bosworth, Planner /Secretary ANNOUNCEMENTS: Chmn. Dodd stated Mr. Paul and Mr. Roth were excused from the meeting, and Ms. Kautenburg(a) would be voting in stead. He also verified that six present members met the minimum quorum of four. APPROVAL OF MINUTES: MOTION by Durr /Carter to accept the minutes of the June 20, 2013 meeting as submitted. Motion was approved unanimously by voice vote. OLD BUSINESS: None NEW BUSINESS: A. QUASI - JUDICIAL PUBLIC HEARING — CR512 OVERLAY DISTRICT WAIVER — NEW YORK BARBER SHOP — 867 SEBASTIAN BOULEVARD — WAIVER REQUEST FROM ALLOWABLE BUILDING GRAPHICS AND COLOR STANDARDS — LDC SECTIONS 54- 4- 21.B.4(a) & (b) Chairman Dodd asked the Commissioners if they had any ex -parte communication to disclose. There was none. The applicants and staff were sworn in by City Attorney Robert Ginsburg. Ms. Nora Bonilla, 867 Roseland Road, applicant and part owner of the New York Barber Shop, stated she would like to finish the painting of the building, which was started as a way to catch passerby's attention, since business was slow right now. Ms. Bosworth stated the painting project was brought to the attention of the Community Development Department, and based on some of the specific architectural overlay district requirements in place, staff asked the owners to stop painting until they could get a decision by CC CL c Q PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION MINUTES OF REGULAR MEETING OF JULY 11, 2013 the Commission to continue, or not. The two sections of the LDC that are being requested to be waived are the prohibited building graphics section [to allow diagonal stripes] and standard colors [to allow red, white, and blue]. She further explained that the LDC specified allowable base, trim and secondary trim colors for structures along CR512. Staff was not making any recommendations at this time, the decision was the Commission's, and a decision to grant the waiver would allow the painting project to be finished, and a denial would mean what was started would have to be painted over. Mr. Carter wanted to know how much of the building has been painted. Ms. Bosworth referred to the picture exhibits in the agenda packets, which indicated the right portion of the front façade facing CR 512 had been painted red, white, and blue, and the left side had been taped to prepare for the striping. Mr. Carter asked if a barber pole had been considered for advertising. Ms. King pointed out that one already exists on the building next to the front door, but was hard to see now that it blended in with the red, white, and blue striping. Mr. Carter suggested a larger one could be used instead of the painting. Mr. Durr asked if the project was brought to staffs attention by a disgruntled neighbor. Staff stated no, but a code enforcement officer was sent to the property to ask them to stop painting. Ms. Bosworth was not sure if a formal case was started with an issuance of a violation notice, or if a courtesy verbal stop work order was given, and the owners then came in to see staff. Mr. Durr noted there was no one in the audience [i.e. disgruntled neighbor], and Ms. Bosworth verified 20± notices were sent to surrounding property owners, a legal ad was placed in the newspaper, and she had not received any calls or questions from neighbors who received letters. Mr. Qizilbash asked if only the front of the building was going to be painted up to window height as shown on the pictures. Ms. Bonilla stated yes, only the front. Mr. Qizilbash asked if the colors and design was to show that it was a barber shop. Ms. Bonilla stated yes, and Mr. Qizilbash questioned why it had to be the whole wall, and suggested maybe it could be painted just around the entrance door. He felt the whole wall to be too much. Mr. Dodd verifed the applicants owned the building, and were not tenants. Mr. Reyes noted the picture showed a decent-sized "New York Barber Shop" monument sign and asked if the applicants would consider painting some red, white, and blue striping on the sign instead. He also asked staff if there were any previous waiver requests for building graphics. Ms. Bosworth stated not for graphics but one from the color standards, which was denied. Ms. King also stated, similarly, there were a couple of waiver requests to allow for striped awnings, which were not approved, and the awnings were painted solid. Mr. Reyes asked the applicant if the barber shop was the only business being operated from the building as he has seen numerous vehicles for sale at the site, and was not sure if the red, white and blue painting was being used like all the flags at the used auto business on US #1. Ms. Bonilla stated the barber shop was the only business, and that a few customers had parked some sale vehicles on their site temporarily. Mr. Reyes also asked how many other barber shops were located within the corridor. Staff cited two "barber shops", but noted there are other hair salons which may be unisex. Mr. Reyes noted this shop had the largest sign. Ms. King stated the sign was properly permitted and met size regulations. There was no one from the public who spoke in favor of the request. There was no one from the public who spoke in opposition of the request. The applicant had no further statements or presentation. Staff reviewed the criteria the Commission must use in determining its decision, as noted in the staff report. She stated the Commission could approve the request, deny the request, or approve 2 PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION MINUTES OF REGULAR MEETING OF JULY 11, 2013 with conditions, and repeated a previous suggestion of allowing the design just around the front door. Mr. Dodd also had two suggestions in that the size of the striping be changed, or that the waiver be applicable only to the current barber shop business and that the applicants commit to repainting the building if the shop closes. Mr. Durr asked if the request was approved, would it set precedent for other businesses in the corridor. Mr. Ginsburg stated future cases should be reviewed on its own merits, but that this case would most likely be discussed, as others were tonight, and probably influence a decision. Mr. Dodd felt if approved, other businesses might start requesting waivers more regularly. Ms. Kautenburg stated she drives CR 512 every day and never noticed the barber shop until they started painting the building, and then knew, because of the colors, that was the barber shop. She felt painting was the best, least expensive way a business can draw attraction to itself. She opined fashionable colors can change over time, and when you approve a particular pallete, it should be reviewed every so often, as buildings colors can get boring, and disappear. The painting would affect the business, and the owners were hard working, tax-paying persons. Even if you can't read, the building would say "barber shop". She also felt that the process of a waiver should always be available to every citizen, and should not be discouraged. MOTION by Kautenburg/Carter that the waiver be granted. ROLL CALL: Mr. Durr no Mr. Qizilbash no Ms. Kautenburg yes Mr. Reyes no Mr. Carter yes Mr. Dodd no The vote was 2-4. Motion denied. MOTION by Reyes/Qizilbash to deny the waiver [request] for New York Barber Shop at 867 Sebastian Boulevard from allowable building graphics and color standards. ROLL CALL: Mr. Reyes yes Mr. Dodd yes Mr. Durr yes Mr. Carter yes Ms. Kauntenburg no Mr. Qizilbash yes The vote was 5-1. Motion passed. CHAIRMAN MATTERS: Chmn. Dodd complimented the current construction project for Sebastian Charter Jr. High School, located on Wave Street, stating the new building was impressive. MEMBERS MATTERS: Mr. Durr mentioned that at the Barber Street/CR 512 intersection, if facing north, the yellow light on the left light was out, for staff to pass on to the appropriate department. Mr. Carter asked for an update on the Clams R Us project. Ms. Bosworth stated that Phase I, which was the landclearing, stormwater installation, and retaining wall construction, was completed. Phase II would be the implementation of the aquaculture facility including new docks, up-dwellers, and raceways. The owner was a bit behind the construction schedule noted on the 3 PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION MINUTES OF REGULAR MEETING OF JULY 11, 2013 site plan, and staff did not know when the owner proposed to start Phase II. There was a two year window to start the Phase III residential structure. DIRECTOR MATTERS: Staff stated the July 18th meeting would be cancelled, and that Mr. Minner will be presenting the proposed 5-year Capital Improvement Program and budget at the August 1st meeting for the Commission's review and recommendation. ATTORNEY MATTERS: Mr. Ginsburg noted he had given each Commissioner a copy of a respected law professor's summary of the recent Supreme Court ruling on the case Koontz vs. St. John's River Water Management District (attached). He stated the Supreme Court doesn't review a lot of land use cases, and its ruling on this one was interesting, and may end up being very important to future land use. He requested the Commissioners read the summary, and he would like to have a future discussion with them regarding the results. Chairman Dodd adjourned the meeting at 7:34 p.m. (db) 4 Page 1 of 3 Bloch on Koontz from Professor John Nolon U.S. Supreme Court Hands Down Koontz Case Editor's Note: Special Thanks to Pace Law Professor John R. Nolon for posting his summary here: Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District U.S. Supreme Court 570 U.S._ (2013) June 25, 2013 Brief and Analysis John R. Nolon — Professor of Law Pace University School of Law Introduction: Prior to this case, courts did not subject the denial of land use permits or the imposition of monetary conditions upon them to heightened scrutiny under its previous decisions in Nollan and Dolan. Those cases involved the imposition of a "title exactions:" a requirement that an easement or title to some of the property be dedicated to the public. To require such a title transfer, if done outside the land use permitting system, would be a taking of property requiring just compensation. Because of this, permit conditions that accomplished the same result were subjected in these cases to heightened scrutiny. Other actions, such as permit denials or monetary exactions, under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, were deferred to by the courts, presumed valid, and the burden of proving that they constituted takings was borne by the applicant. Nollan established that title exactions must bear an essential nexus to the harm prevented; Dolan required that the condition imposed be roughly proportional to the adverse impact of the project on the community. This case, Koontz, extends the principles and standards of Nollan and Dolan to permit denials and monetary exactions greatly expanding the reach of Federal constitutional concerns deeply into the state and local land use system. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion for 5 members of the court; Justice Kagan wrote for the 4 member minority. Brief. Mr. Koontz owned 14.9 acres of highly constrained land at the intersection of two major thoroughfares in Florida. He proposed building on 3.7 of the less constrained acres. To build, he needed a permit from the St. John's River Water Management District in compliance with two separate state statutes designed to protect water resources, including wetlands. Koontz offered to impose a conservation easement on I 1 acres and to conduct other engineering work as mitigation measures. The District thought these were insufficient to protect the affected water resources in accordance with the relevant statutes. Using words such as "proposed" and "suggested," the majority opinion of the Court describes the two concessions the District asked of the petitioner. One involved developing only one acre and building costly stormwater management facilities on site, and enlarging the land subject to the conservation easement to over 13 acres; the other would allow the 3.7 acre development, but require petitioner to consider methods of doing off site mitigation enhancing about 50 acres elsewhere in the watershed. The District suggested some such work including paying contractors to replace culverts and fill ditches indicating that it "would favorably consider" alternatives to its "suggested" offsite mitigation projects, if the petitioner proposed something "equivalent." (Where a conservation easement is required, it exacts a property interest from the petitioner and is a title exaction; while asking an owner to pay for off -site mitigation work subjects her to a monetary exaction.) Koontz stopped negotiating at this point saying that his proposal was "as good as it can get." The District denied the permit and Koontz brought an action under a Florida statute that allows owners to recover monetary damages if a state agency's action is "an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power constituting a taking without just compensation." Although he won in the trial and intermediate appeal court levels, the Florida Supreme Court supported the District's actions and found that the higher scrutiny standards of the Nollan and Dolan cases were inapplicable because the District did not approve the project on the condition that petitioner accede to demands, but rather denied his application because he refused to make concessions. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished a demand for an interest in real property as found in Nollan and Dolan from a demand for money. As a result, that court held that neither the denial nor the monetary demand were subject to higher scrutiny. The majority of U.S. Supreme Court disagrees on both counts. The Court holds that under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which prevents governments from coercing people to give up their constitutional rights, courts cannot distinguish between approving a permit on a condition and denying a permit because the applicant refused to agree to a concession. The Federal Constitution can be violated in permit denial cases, the Court notes, not because property interest were taken, but because extortionate demands burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation. "The impermissible denial of a government benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury." http://mail.aol.com/'378-'14-1 I Vaol -6 /erg- us /Suite.aspx 7/5/2013 Page 2 of 3 The Court also holds that where "there is a direct link between the government's demand and a specific parcel of property" the requirements of Nollan and Dolan apply. "Such so- called `in lieu of fees are utterly commonplace,..., and they are functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions." While noting that land use agencies in the permitting process have vast discretion that can be abused, the Court also recognizes the legitimacy of land use requirements that require "landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct." It notes that this practice is a "hallmark of responsible land use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack." Subjecting exactions of property interests and cash in lieu of to higher scrutiny under the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests of Nollan and Dolan, in the Court's view, both allows internalization of externalities and prevents the abuse of discretion. The Court does not discuss what remedies might be available for a "Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation either here or in other cases." It did not decide whether the conditions complained of by Koontz would violate the nexus and proportionality standards of Nollan/Dolan. It did not find that the conditions subjected were demands. In fact, the majority refused to characterize precisely how the conditions to the permit were communicated. "We decline to reach the respondent's argument that its demands for property were too indefinite to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan." The boundaries of what constitutes a monetary exaction were not made clear by the majority. These matters were remanded to the Florida courts for resolution, to the extent that they are relevant to Mr. Koontz's claims, which must now decide whether the suggestions made by the District were sufficiently distinct to constitute demands; whether those demands meet the nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan, and whether Mr. Koontz suffered any damages for which there is a state remedy. Analysis: Higher Scrutiny Now Applies to Permit Denials and Monetary Exactions: It is not clear whether Koontz is a regulatory taking or due process case. It is sufficient for the moment to recognize that the principles and standards of Nolan and Dolan, concededly takings cases, were applied to the facts of Koontz under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which applies to many settings having nothing to do with takings. Saying that citizens do not hold their constitutional rights subject to unconstitutional conditions fundamentally sounds in due process. Permit denials and monetary exactions bear no constitutional relationship to title exactions, which can "take" fundamental property rights including the right to exclude others. In one sense, this distinction doesn't matter because under Koontz permit denials and monetary exactions are now subject to higher scrutiny. al 1l From this flow several other consequences and concerns. Land Use (Decisions are Subject to Doubt Bather than Deference: The case extends the reach of Federal constitutional law deeply into the state and local land use system. There is a fundamental and far - reaching difference between deference and doubt as a judicial attitude toward land use decisions. Before Koontz, all but title exactions were subject to a judicial presumption of validity and a burden imposed on the applicant to prove that denials or monetary exactions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Post- Koontz, denials of permits where applicants fail to properly mitigate project impacts by following suggestions made by agency representatives and any monetary conditions imposed on permits are now subject to higher scrutiny, a judicial standard that requires the government to prove that its actions bear a "essential nexus" to the property's impacts and that the monetary conditions required are "roughly proportional" to the project's impact on the community. One serious concern here is that Federal takings law is notoriously vague and flawed. All of the many conflicting, perplexing, and complex doctrines of this body of law are now seated at the head of the table regarding the many land use decisions to which Koontz might be applied. This will not benefit developers uniformly because it may sap the system of predictability, could lead to more restrictive zoning standards, and might require them to pay the costs of the now - required municipal studies. Land Use Decision Processes are Subject to Doubt: Post - Koontz the land use decision - making process, which has been characterized by give - and -take negotiations among applicants, affected stakeholders, and land use boards, is also subjected to doubt. Under the majority's decision and using its terminology, suggestions that the applicant modify the proposed project to mitigate environmental conditions or enhance its sustainability are potentially unconstitutional conditions that will be subjected to higher scrutiny and that can result in monetary damage awards against state and local agencies. This consequence of Koontz will impose a near -term chill on the land use decision making process to the detriment of communities and developers. Lawyers for land use boards will be extraordinarily cautious about authorizing discussions about project modifications that will be more beneficial to the community. The twin prospects here are that more projects may be simply turned down or inferior projects approved. Corollary Matters: If Koontz imposes new costs to conduct studies to prove the proportionality of conditions, will these costs be imposed on developers as additional permit fees? • How much will Koontz affect the SEQRA process? Will developers have to pay more fees here as well to pay for municipal studies needed to carry the burden of proof that lead agencies now have? • Are legislated exactions, such as wetland banking, solid waste impact fees, or mandatory affordable housing requirements, that apply through some formula, subject to Koontz, or is the case limited to individual permit conditions aimed at a specific project's impact such as those involved in Nollan and Dolan? If legislated and formulaic exaction systems are subject to Koontz, will the "individualized determination" requirement of Dolan, not mentioned by either the majority or dissent, be implicated? If so, how greatly will this affect area- or community-wide impact fees and other exactions? http: / /mail.aol.com/37 834 -1 l 1/aol- 6/en- us /Suite.aspx 7/5/2013 Page 3 of 3 • What constitutes a monetary exaction? Does anything that costs a developer money impose a monetary condition? Did the majority truly intend such a consequence? • Will Koontz lead to new forms of negotiations? Will pre- application processes become routine in order to divorce suggestions made from the formal permitting process? Will the effect of this be to prolong the land use approval process to the developer's detriment? • Will local governments be tempted to make zoning standards more restrictive if they fear losing the ability to negotiate community benefits in the decision - making process? • Will non - regulatory community- or area -wide plans, floating zones, and more flexibility techniques be relied on that offer developers choices that they may voluntary choose as an alternative to the now more - restrictive zoning? • Was it wise for a 5 -4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to subject thousands of state and local land use agencies to all this doubt and prospect of further litigation? What benefits to developers and the public does the Koontz case realize? The majority fails to say. II In another sense it does. Under Lingle, the Court carefully distinguished due process from takings law, setting aside decades of confusion over how a regulation that fails to advance a substantial governmental interest can possibly be a taking. Substantive due process claims, Lingle points out, are subject to rational basis testing with courts deferring to regulators. 5 usan 'Frevarthen Member; Board Certified in City, County and Local Government Laiv WEISS SERoTA HELFMAN IPASTORIZA COLE &BONISKE Zoo Mast Broward Bhd., Suite. t9oo I Fort t.atiderdale, FL 33 301 P: (954) 763 -4 242 F: (954) 764 -7770 wsh- law.com I vCa.rd F07 in n THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT This message, together with any attachments, is intended only for the addressee. It may contain information which is legally privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure. 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